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BAR SPONSORED BILLS BECOME LAW
Six bills sponsored by the Colorado Bar Association and
fourteen bills sponsored by the Denver Bar Association were
passed by the 39th General Assembly and signed by the Governor.
Reports submitted by C. Edgar Kettering and Ira L. Quiat, Chairmen of the Legislative Committees of the two Bar Associations
respectively, are here published. From these reports readers will
note that the State Bar Association sponsored mostly controversial
measures and the Denver Bar Association sponsored so-called
"lawyers bills" affecting property titles and the practice of law.
The two committees worked very closely in their legislative campaigns and many of the bills sponsored by the Denver Bar Association were sponsored at the request of the Board of Governors
of the State Bar Association. The report of the Denver committee
summarizes the provisions of the new laws because it is felt that
the members of the bar should be informed of these changes at
the earliest possible time.
REPORT OF COLORADO BAR LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE

The following is a report of the activities of the Legislative
Committee of the Colorado Bar Association during the session of
the 1953 General Assembly. We were requested by the Association
President, Mr. Jean S. Breitenstein, and the Board of Governors
to sponsor the following legislation:
1. A Bill for the increase of salaries of judges of courts of
record.
Many Bills for this purpose were introduced, ours being, so
far as I know, the only one wherein Supreme, District and County
Judges were combined in one Bill. We appeared before several
committee and informal hearings advocating $15,000 per year for
the Supreme court and $12,000 per year for the District court (the
County judges' salaries being graduated in proportion). Many
outside factors, forces, and the work of many individuals entered
into the ultimate passage of separate Bills increasing the Supreme
court salaries from $8500 to $12,000, the District court salaries
from $7500 to $9000, and the County court salaries on a graduating scale, with the Denver County Judge being raised from $8000
to $9500. The Bar Association, together with other organizations
and individuals took an active part with respect to this salary
legislation. I believe our efforts were particularly helpful (a) in
the general education of legislators on the subject of the necessity
for judicial salary increases, and (b) in coordinating the efforts
of the various sponsors so that such efforts were directed toward
the entire program for the benefit of all the courts of record.
2. A Bill creating a Judicial or Departmental Council giving the Supreme Court supervisory authority over inferior courts.
This Bill was sponsored by the Association and was enacted.
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3. Enabling legislation permitting certain county judges to
sit for district judges, in accordance with the recently adopted
constitutional amendment.
This Bill was passed with practically no opposition.
4. Legislation in connection with the revision of the 1953
statutes under the work of Mr. Charles Rose.
This legislation was adopted without the necessity for any
active efforts on our part.
5. Legislation sponsored by the Mental Hygiene Sub-committee relating to the adjudication and commitment proceedings
of mentally ill persons.
This Bill was defeated largely on the issue of requiring homes
for mental defectives to receive all patients committed thereto
without regard to the availability of space. Much time and effort
had been expended in the preparation and sponsoring of this Bill
by the Mental Hygiene Committee.
In addition to the foregoing proposed legislation, we interested ourselves in assisting in the enactment of a new law increasing and widening the field of payment of expenses to district and
county judges when traveling out of the counties of their residence.
This Bill was defeated on third reading in spite of the efforts of
your Committee to secure its passage.
Special acknowledgment must be given to the members of the
Committee and to the members of the legal profession who are
serving in the legislature. Their assistance was invaluable in our
activities.
C. EDGAR KETTERING,

Chairman.
REPORT OF THE DENVER BAR LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE

The Legislative Committee of the Denver Bar Association
drafted and actively sponsored in the 39th General Assembly
sixteen bills. Fifteen of the Bills were passed by both houses, one
was vetoed, and the other fourteen are now laws. We believe that
this is the best record ever established by the Denver Bas Association and will attempt to briefly summarize these new laws and
point out the changes.
SENATE BILL NO. 205-AMENDING SECTION 50, CHAPTER 176, 1935 C.S.A.-Sub-section (a) of this new law improves
the language of old Section 50 and deletes provisions which are
found elsewhere in our probate laws. For instance, Section 253
of Chapter 176 provides for the acceptance and waiver of service.
There was no need to re-enact it in this new law.
The old law "required" all persons cited to attend the "probate." In most instances there is no contest or objections to a will,
yet every interested party served with a citation was required to
attend. The Court, the Clerk and the Bailiff all had to explain to
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such persons that they did not actually have to be present unless
they opposed the will.
Under the new act the citation merely advises the interested parties of the time, date and place of the hearing of the
probate.
Sub-section (b) of the new act provides that if a person objects to a will presented for probate because he claims under another will, then such other will must be filed simultaneously with
the objections or a reason be given why it-is not filed, and the objections must set forth the reasons for the failure to file the same.
It fixes the parties to be served in case of a caveat, and, upon the
filing of such objections, all other wills in the possession of the
proponent of the will must be filed. The Court in one or more
hearings determines which of all purported wills is the will of the
decedent.
Before the passage of this new act persons claiming under
another will merely filed objections and the sole issue, was on the
will presented for probate. If that will was denied probate then
the other will would have to be presented and the same routine
gone through. Under sub-section (b) multiple hearings and trials,
where there is more than one will, are avoided and the delay of
finding out which is the true will of the decedent is eliminated.
SENATE BILL NO. 208-PROVIDING FOR THE OUTLAWING OF CONTRACTS OF PURCHASE AND SALE OF
REAL ESTATE-Section 1 of this act provides that no action or
other proceeding shall be brought or maintained under a contract for purchase and sale of real property by a person (out of
possession) after ten years, from the date fixed for the delivery
of the deed under such contract, and if no date of delivery is
specified in the contract, ten years after the date when the final installment of the purchase price was due.
Section 2 has the same provisions concerning a bond for a
deed.
Section 3, makes it clear that the act does not affect Section
116 of Chapter 40, 1935 C.S.A. (outlawing agreements in the nature of an option) and grants one year from the effective date of
the act in which to bring any action on contracts where the 10-year
period has already expired or will expire.
For years old contracts of sale and purchase shown on abstracts have plagued title lawyers and have required Quiet Title
actions to remove the cloud against real estate caused by such
contracts.
SENATE BILL NO. 210-MINING AND MANUFACTURING CORPORATIONS-Since territorial days the Directors of a
mining or manufacturing company had no power to mortgage the
company mines or plant or its principal machinery until such encumbrancing was approved by a majority of the outstanding stock
of such corporation at a special stockholders meeting. In the early
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days when fake promoters were selling spurious mining stock and
engaging in other doubtful and illegal ventures such provisions had
a salutary effect. However, those days are long past and the provision remained on our statute books. A lawyer could not safely
pass any trust deed or mortgage by any corporation because the
corporation might be engaged in some manufacturing venture,
and the statute provided that without the approval of the stockholders such mortgage was absolutely void.
In 1951 the Legislature amended this section and provided
that if all of the stockholders signed the consent to such mortgage
that no stockholders meeting need be held.
This bill repeals this antiquated provision so there is no
longer any difference between a mining or manufacturing company and other corporations.
SENATE BILL NO. 212-ASSAULT WITH A DEADLY
WEAPON NOW A FELONY-The District Attorney's office requested the Bar Association to present this bill to the Legislature.
For years the offense of an assault with a deadly weapon was a
high misdemeanor under our laws. It is now a felony.
Juries, in trying a person for an assault with intent to commit
murder, were handed a number of possible verdicts. One of these
possible verdicts was "guilty of assault with a deadly weapon."
Many juries could not agree and compromised on "assault with a
deadly weapon" in the belief that the same was a serious offense
carrying with it a penitentiary term. In many instances such
criminals escaped with minor sentences. This situation is now
remedied.
SENATE BILL NO. 215-ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF CHATTEL MORTGAGES-Under the Colorado Statutes a deed or other
instrument affecting real estate need not be acknowledged. It is
notice to the world when recorded. The acknowledgment merely
permits the instrument to be introduced in evidence without proof
of execution.
For some mysterious reason the Colorado Statutes have always required that a chattel mortgage, in order to be valid against
third parties, in addition to being recorded had to be acknowledged. Many a chattel mortgage has been held to be void even
though recorded because of some technical defect in the acknowledgment. The committee felt that this technical requirement was
arbitrary and unjust.
A chattel mortgage, even though un-acknowledged, is now
notice to everybody if of record.
SENATE BILL NO. 219-DEATH, RESIGNATION OR REMOVAL OF A FIDUCIARY-Sections 90, 91 and 92 of Chapter
176 (1935 C.S.A.) dealt with the removal and resignation of
fiduciaries. There was no express provision in the Statutes dealing with the procedure upon the death of a fiduciary.
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Under Section 90 the court had the power to remove a fiduciary for certain reasons therein specified, but the fiduciary had
to be "summoned." Why, in a proceeding already pending before
the court, it was necessary to summon a fiduciary when the court
had jurisdiction over him is beyond understanding. In many instances it was difficult to serve the summons, and in some instances the court was powerless to stop a fiduciary, especially if
he had power under the will, until he could be served and a hearing had.
Under Section 92, if a fiduciary resigned, the resignation
could not be accepted until notice of his intention to resign by
publication, was given, as in case of a final settlement. If, thereafter the resignation was accepted, was another notice required for
final settlement of the fiduciary's reports?
The new law combines all cases where a fiduciary is to be
replaced, regardless whether the vacancy be caused by death,
resignation or removal. It provides who is to make the final report, and provides for the appointment of a successor immediately.
No longer is it necessary to summon a fiduciary in case the
question of his removal is before the court. The court may upon
its own motion or upon the petition of any interested party notify
the fiduciary to appear at the time fixed, and if the notice cannot
be served personally, the notice is given in such manner as the
court may direct, and the court can then hear the matterand
remove the fiduciary.
Under Section 3 of this new law, whenever the court believes that it is for the best interests of the estate, the court may
suspend or limit the powers of any fiduciary, with or without
notice, until a hearing can be had. We believe the courts had
this inherent power before, but probate judges were hesitant to
enter an order curbing a fiduciary who was mismanaging or
wasting the assets of an estate until such fiduciary was summoned.
In a recent instance an administrator proceeded to spend substantial amounts of estate funds in a drunken spree. The court
hesitated to instruct the bank not to honor his checks. He could
not be found and before he was finally located and summoned, a
substantial part of the estate funds had been dissipated.
SENATE BILL NO. 221-REPORTS OF FIDUCIARIESThis law amends Section 217 of our probate law. There was no
provision for the destruction of vouchers in estate proceedings
regardless of the period that had passed after the estate was
closed, and the files of the County Court were cluttered with
vouchers going back to territorial days. The County Judges
wanted authority to destroy vouchers 10 years after the date of
the discharge of the fiduciary. The new law 'gives the court that
power.
When the committee studied Section 217 it found other things
that needed correcting. It simplified and improved the language.
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Under the old law the fiduciary had to file his report every six
months, but in practice very few fiduciaries did so. Under the old
law the court could dispense with a report but it was questionable
whether the court had authority to enlarge the time.
The new law empowers the court upon proper showing to
shorten or lengthen the six month period or dispense with
the necessity of filing the report.
The old law contained a peculiar provision. In all estates
where any heir, legatee or devisee was unknown, or if known,
there was no person qualified to receive the legacy or distributive
share, the fiduciary had to serve a copy of each report upon the
Attorney General. Not one lawyer in a hundred complied with this
requirement, yet it was mandatory. The new law now makes it
optional with the court. The court may, if it deems best, require
such service.
SENATE BILL NO. 267-HOMESTEADS-The 1951 Legislature attempted to increase the exempt amount of a homestead
from $2,000 to $5,000. It only amended the first section of the
homestead law to read $5,000. The other sections continued to
provide for a $2,000 exemption. The new law fixes the amount
at $5000 in all sections.
Under the old law a marginal entry had to be entered on the
margin of the instrument of the acquisition of title unless such
instruments was not of record.
With the prospect of microfilming (discussed hereafter) an
impossible situation would have been presented, because no marginal entry could be made on the microfilm record. Under the
new law, a homestead can be created by either a marginal entry
or by an instrument in writing in which the owner or his spouse
states that the property is being homesteaded.
The act re-writes and clarifies provisions of the old law.
Minor changes have cleared up ambiguities and more clearly defined certain rights.
Under the old law, if a homestead were sold and the proceeds
invested in another home, the new home was also exempt to the
extent of the homestead, and no marginal entry on the deed of the
new home was required.
Under the new law the proceeds of the homestead are exempt
for a period of one year, and if a new home is acquired it must
be homesteaded within 30 days from the recording of the deed.
At the time of the adoption of the old homestead law we did
not have joint tenancy in this state. Provisions are made to protect the rights of joint tenants and to define rights upon the
death of one joint tenant.
Upon the destruction of the homestead by any casualty the insurance proceeds are exempt in the same manner as if the homestead had been sold.
The act also improves the present provisions concerning the
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conveying or encumbrance of the homestead and provides that
when two parties of opposite sex having the same surname join
in the conveyance or encumbrance of the homestead, it is presumed that the parties signing the same are husband and wife.
HOUSE BILL NO. 345-ALLOWANCE TO WIDOWS AND
CHILDREN-Section 1 of this new law authorizes the court, after
a hearing, to permit the spouse or the minor children of the deceased owner of a home to remain in possession of the home and
the household furniture without payment of rent for such period
as the court may deem just.
Upon the death of a person the court may make reasonable
provision for the surviving spouse or the minor children from
and after the appointment of a fiduciary, and payments made are
deducted from the widow's or minors' allowance.
This permits the court, instead of waiting six months to determine the priority of claims, to enter an order for the support
of the dependents of the decedent at once.
The next paragraph of this section increases the widow's
allowance to $3500. If there be no widow, then the minor children
of the decedent are entitled to such allowance. If there be stepchildren the court no longer is compelled to give the widow and her
children one-half and the step-children the other half. Under the
old law if the widow had five children of her own and there was
only one step-child, the step-child would have received $1,000
and the widow and her children the other $1,000.
Under the new law the court divides the allowance among
the widow (if there be step-children) and the children of the
decedent in such manner as the court deems best.
Section 3 of this bill amends Section 212 and increases the
amount allowed to the spouse of a mental incompetent or the
minor children, before the payment of creditors, to the same
amount as provided for the widows' allowance.
HOUSE BILL NO. 351-AGREEMENTS TO MAKE A WILL
-The Supreme Court in a recent case reaffirmed the principle
that if two persons, at or about the same time, made wills with
similar or reciprocal provisions, that that fact alone established
an agreement to make the wills, and the wills were irrevocable.
Most lawyers felt that this principle of law was unfair and that
many similar wills were drawn by spouses without any agreement that the wills should be irrevocable.
This new law provides that the agreement to make a will
must be proved by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, and
the fact that two or more wills were executed at or about the
same time by different persons shall not of itself be any evidence
that such wills were made in consideration of each other.
HOUSE BILL NO. 353-TAX DEEDS-Section 258 of Chapter 142 (Revenue Act), 1935 C.S.A. provided that a treasurer's
deed "when substantially thus executed and recorded shall vest in
the purchaser all right, title . . ." Lawyers in examining titles
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found a treasurer's deed of a certain date. Subsequently they
found a quit claim deed from the grantee in the treasurer's deed,
but the treasurer's deed was not recorded before the date of the
quit claim deed. Lawyers therefore turned down the title because
the grantee in the treasurer's deed was not the owner until he
had recorded his treasurer's deed.
This new act amends Section 258 and provides that upon the
execution of a treasurer's deed, regardless of the date of recording,
title vests in the grantee.
HOUSE BILL NO. 355-EXTENSION OF MORTGAGES
AND TRUST DEEDS-Section 123 of Chapter 40, 1935 C.S.A.
states that in no event can a mortgage, trust deed or other lien be extended beyond a total of 30 years by various extensions. Lawyers
had some doubt as to the meaning of the 30-year period extensions.
A new section was added which now provides that the "30
years" means 30 years from the original maturity date of the
mortgage, trust deed or other lien.
HOUSE BILL NO. 392-MICROFILM RECORDING-In
1951 the Legislature authorized microfilm recording in Denver.
The City of Denver was about to inaugurate a system of microfilming of real estate records which would have made the examination of real estate records by lawyers a difficult, tedious and
endless task.
The Legislature amended Chapter 130 of the 1951 Session
Laws and provided that real estate records could be microfilmed
but the recorder had to maintain one set of records in books which
are legible without the aid of any enlarging device.
The 1951 act provided that microfilm records were not subject to an inspection by the public, but the recorder could permit
the inspection thereof.
The new act makes the microfilm records as well as other
records open to examination by the public.
HOUSE BILL NO. 395-VALIDATING ACTS OF A FIDUCIARY UPON THE REVOCATION OF LETTERS-Under the
law, when a person was adjudged to be a mental incompetent the
court must forthwith appoint a conservator and the conservator
takes possession of the assets of the mental inconipetent. If the
mental incompetent or some other person requested a jury trial,
where did that leave the conservator if the mental incompetent
was subsequently found to be sane?
If a will were admitted to probate and the executor proceeded
to act thereunder, and thereafter a later will was discovered and
the Letters revoked, what would be the liability of the fiduciary
originally appointed?
The new law provides that any act of a fiduciary appointed
by a court shall not be invalid or void solely for the reason that
the order appointing him was annulled or revoked.
IRA L. QUIAT, Chairman.

